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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Jose Guadalupe Perez-Jungo entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge of
possession of methamphetamine, preserving his right to challenge the district court's
order denying his Motion to Suppress. Mr. Perez-Jungo asserts that the district court
erred in denying his Motion to Suppress because his prolonged detention and the
subsequent search of his vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On November 1, 2012 at approximately 1:37 a.m., Trooper Marquez of the Idaho
State Police saw a truck parked to the side of a two-lane road. (Tr., p.8, Ls.10-15, p.11,
Ls.13-24.) 1 The road was gravel with no divider markers and had borrow pits on both
sides of the gravel. (Tr., p.11, Ls.19-2S, p.12, Ls.1-9.) The truck was pulled to the edge
of the gravel. (Tr., p.11, Ls.6-24; Exhibit 12.) Trooper Marquez testified at the hearing
on the Motion to Suppress that he thought the vehicle might be abandoned or that
someone might need help.

(Tr., p.13, Ls.24-2S, p.14, Ls.1-24.)

He turned on his

emergency lights and his spotlight, which he trained on the driver's side mirror.
(Tr., p.1S, Ls.2-7.) Trooper Marquez explained that he activated his emergency lights
for officer safety because he wanted to let people know he was a police officer.
(Tr., p.1S, Ls.8-2S.) Trooper Marquez also testified that he thought the truck might have
been involved in "vandalisms or thefts" that had occurred in the area four to six weeks
earlier or that the truck may have been stolen. (Tr., p.14, Ls.1-S, p.40, Ls.14-2S.)
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Trooper Marquez approached the passenger-side window and saw Mr. PerezJungo sitting in the driver's seat. (Tr., p.19, Ls.22-24.) Trooper Marquez knocked on
the passenger-side window. (Tr., p.20, Ls.1-3.) Mr. Perez-Jungo was attempting to roll
down the window when Trooper Marquez opened the passenger door.

(Tr., p.20,

Ls.15-21.) Trooper Marquez testified that he opened the passenger door because he
"just wanted to know what was going on and why [Mr. Perez-Jungo] was out there to
make sure he didn't need assistance." (Tr., p.20, Ls.15-21.)
Trooper Marquez testified that, after he opened the door, he saw a figurine of
Santa Muerte2 mounted on the dashboard. (Tr., p.20, Ls.22-25, p.21, Ls.1-10.) He also
testified that Mr. Perez-Jungo's eyes were bloodshot and glassy. (Tr., p.22, Ls.7-10.)
Trooper Marquez asked Mr. Perez-Jungo what he was doing and Mr. Perez-Jungo
explained that he was waiting for someone who was going to talk to him about
employment. (Tr., p.23, Ls.11-15.) Trooper Marquez asked if he had been drinking and
Mr. Perez-Jungo said he had not. (Tr., p.42, Ls.8-12.) Trooper Marquez then asked for
Mr. Perez-Jungo's license and registration, which he took back to his patrol car.

All transcript citations refer to the transcript of the Motion to Suppress hearing held on
January 29, 2013, unless otherwise indicated.
2 Santa Muerte is a female folk saint who appears as a skeletal figure dressed in a long
robe. She is venerated primarily in Mexico and the United States, and is associated
with healing, protection, and safe delivery into the afterlife. In the late 2000s, it was
estimated that there were around five million devotees in Mexico, constituting
approximately five percent of the country's population. Santa Muerte also has tens of
thousands of followers in the United States, primarily among Hispanic populations.
Santa Muerte is most popular in poor communities and, as a result, has been
associated with criminal activity due to the public belief in her by certain, mostly lowlevel,
criminal
organizations.
See
Wikipedia,
Santa
Muerte,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Santa_Muerte (describing the history of Santa Muerte) (as of
Jane. 31, 2014, 15:55 GMT).
1
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(Tr., p.24, Ls.9-10.)

Trooper Marquez ran the license plate for the truck through

dispatch and determined the truck was not stolen. (Tr., pA1, Ls.1S-22.)
While he continued to detain Mr. Perez-Jungo, Trooper Marquez asked dispatch
to send a drug detection dog and requested a second patrol unit. (Tr., p.24, Ls.13-21.)
When he was told by dispatch that a drug dog would take at least 20 minutes to arrive,
Trooper Marquez said that he "didn't have enough time" to wait for the dog. (Exhibit 12,
at 10:21).

While still holding Mr. Perez-Jungo's license and registration, Trooper

Marquez waited 10 or 15 minutes for another unit to arrive. (Tr., p.27, LsA-S.) Three
additional units arrived and Trooper Marquez ordered Mr. Perez-Jungo out of his truck.
(Tr., p.44, Ls.20-22, p.25, Ls.19-23.) Trooper Marquez spoke with his sergeant and
with the other officers and told them that the reason for the detention was that
"obviously something was not right." (Tr., pAl, Ls.15-19.)

At no point did Trooper

Marquez tell any of the other officers that he was investigating Mr. Perez-Jungo for
driving under the influence. (Tr., pA7, Ls.3-14.)
Trooper Marquez placed Mr. Perez-Jungo in front of his patrol car and
questioned him about prior drug use. (Tr., p.27, Ls.13-25, p.28, Ls.1-6.) Mr. PerezJungo was never asked to perform any sobriety tests or answer any questions that
would be used to evaluate a person for driving under the influence. (Tr., pA4, Ls.5-19.)
Meanwhile, other officers shined their flashlights into the windows of Mr. Perez-Jungo's
truck. (Tr., p.27, Ls.21-22, pA8, Ls.20-24.) Following this examination of the interior of
Mr. Perez-Jungo's truck, Deputy Kingsland told Trooper Marquez that he saw a baggie
with an orange substance in it on the dashboard and a "hollowed out" light bulb in the
netting behind the passenger seat, which he testified can be used as a smoking device
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to inject narcotics.

(Tr., p.28, Ls.7-18, p.57, Ls.1-3, 16-23.)

Trooper Marquez then

searched the truck. (Preliminary Hearing Transcript 11/21/12, p.13, Ls.17-24.) Trooper
Marquez scraped the light bulb and tested the residue using a NIK test, which returned
a presumptive positive for cocaine.
Ls.1-23.)

(Preliminary Hearing Transcript 11/21/12, p.14,

Trooper Marquez then found a baggie in the pocket of a jacket on the

passenger seat containing a sUbstance that he also tested, which returned a
presumptive positive for cocaine and amphetamine.

(Preliminary Hearing Transcript

11/21/12, p.16, Ls.18-25, p.17, Ls.1-2.)
Mr. Perez-Jungo was charged with one count of possession of cocaine, but the
information was later amended to change the substance to rnethamphetamine, and one
misdemeanor count of possession of drug paraphernalia.

(R., pp.52-53, 155-156.)

Mr. Perez-Jungo filed a Motion to Suppress arguing that the detention, search, and
interrogation violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.

(R., pp.67-BO.)

The

district court denied, in part, Mr. Perez-Jungo's Motion to Suppress. (R., pp.116-139.)
Mr. Perez-Jungo then entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of
methamphetamine, preserving the ability to challenge the district court's order denying
his Motion to Suppress.

(R., pp.172-178.)

Thereafter, the district court imposed a

unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, but suspended the sentence and
placed Mr. Perez-Jungo on probation.

(R., pp.170-171.)

appealed. (R., pp.193-194.)
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Mr. Perez-Jungo timely

ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Perez-Jungo's Motion to Suppress because his
detention was unduly prolonged and, therefore, the subsequent search of his person
and vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Perez-Jungo's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
The district court erred in denying Mr. Perez-Jungo's Motion to Suppress

because Mr. Perez-Jungo's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when police officers
illegally prolonged their detention of Mr. Perez-Jungo.

The State failed to meet its

burden of showing that Trooper Marquez had reasonable suspicion to continue to detain
Mr. Perez-Jungo after Trooper Marquez performed a welfare check.

As such, the

district court's order denying Mr. Perez-Jungo's Motion to Suppress should be reversed.

B.

Standard Of Review
In State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297 (Ct. App. 2006), the Court of Appeals

articulated the following standard of review for an appeal from a motion to suppress:
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's
findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely
review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. At
a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses,
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is
vested in the trial court.
Id. at 302 (citations omitted).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Perez-Jungo's Motion To Suppress
Because His Detention Was Illegally Prolonged And, Therefore, Any Evidence
Collected Must Be Suppressed As Fruit Of Illegal Government Activity
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
U.S. Const. amend. IV. The purpose of this constitutional right is to "impose a standard
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of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by governmental agents and thereby
safeguard an individual's privacy and security against arbitrary invasions."
Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824 (Ct. App. 2002).

without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.

State v.

Searches or detentions conducted
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403

U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Butcher, 137 Idaho 125, 129 (Ct. App. 2002). The
State "bears the burden to demonstrate that a warrantless search either fell within a
well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable
under the circumstances." State v. Martinez, 129 Idaho 426,431 (Ct. App. 1996). If the
government fails to meet this burden, the evidence acquired as a result of the il/egal
search, including later-discovered evidence derived from the original illegal search, is
inadmissible in court.

Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984); State v.

Brauch, 133 Idaho 215,219 (1999).

1.

Trooper Marquez Lacked Reasonable Suspicion To Detain Mr. PerezJungo After He Determined That Mr. Perez-Jungo Did Not Need
Assistance

Trooper Marquez seized Mr. Perez-Jungo when he activated his emergency
lights and pulled up behind him. A person is seized or detained within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment if, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable person would
have believed he or she was no longer free to leave. State v. Waldie, 126 Idaho 864,
866 (Ct. App. 1995). Although a detention may not have been intended by Trooper
Marquez at this point, a detention occurred because Mr. Perez-Jungo was not free to
leave.

See I.C. § 49-1404 (prohibiting fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer

when signaled to stop by the officer's emergency lights and/or siren); Maddox, supra,
137 Idaho at 824; State v. Mireles, 133 Idaho 690, 692 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that an
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officer activating emergency lights while performing a caretaking function constitutes a
de facto detention). Further, even if Trooper Marquez's use of his emergency lights did

not constitute a seizure, a seizure occurred when Trooper Marquez took and retained
Mr. Perez-Jungo's driver's license and registration since Mr. Perez-Jungo could not
drive away without his license. State v. Goodwin, 121 Idaho 491,493 (1991); State v.
Osborne, 121 Idaho 520,524 (Ct. App. 1991).

Although the initial detention was justified under Trooper Marquez's community
caretaking function, the detention became illegal because Trooper Marquez continued
to detain Mr. Perez-Jungo after his community caretaking role was complete.
The community caretaking function arises from the duty of police officers to help citizens
in need of assistance and is totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute. Maddox, supra,
137 Idaho at 824. The community caretaking function only justifies a detention if there
is a present need for assistance. Cutler, supra, 143 Idaho at 303.
Here, Trooper Marquez testified that, upon seeing the truck, he was (1)
concerned that the truck was abandoned; (2) concerned that someone might need help;
(3) concerned that the vehicle was stolen; and (4) concerned that the truck might be
involved in thefts or vandalisms that occurred in the area. (Tr., p.40, Ls.14-25.) In order
to justify the detention of a citizen under the community caretaking exception, the officer
must have a genuine and warranted concern rather than simply the officer's curiosity, an
unsubstantiated suspicion of criminal activity, or an unwarranted concern that help
might be needed. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841,844 (2004); Maddox, supra, 137 Idaho
at 824-25. Clearly, only the first two concerns identified by Trooper Marquez fall under
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the community caretaking function as defined by the Idaho Supreme Court in Page.
The other two concerns are criminal in nature and require reasonable suspicion to
justify a detention. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S., 1, 21 (1968). As discussed in section
C-2, reasonable suspicion did not exist to support Trooper Marquez's hunches that the
truck was stolen or that it was involved in the vandalism of radio towers.
Therefore, Trooper Marquez's initial detention of Mr. Perez-Jungo can only be
justified by the community caretaking function, the scope of which is limited.

After

shining his spotlight on the truck, Trooper Marquez could clearly see that there was a
person in the driver's seat, immediately dispelling any concern that the truck was
abandoned. (Tr., p.41, Ls.1-4.) Upon making contact with Mr. Perez-Jungo, Trooper
Marquez questioned Mr. Perez-Jungo about what he was doing and Mr. Perez-Jungo
explained that he was waiting for a friend to talk to about a job. (Tr., p.23, Ls.11-15.) At
this point, both of Trooper Marquez's caretaking concerns had been addressed; the
truck was not abandoned, and Mr. Perez-Jungo did not need help.
Trooper Marquez then requested Mr. Perez-Jungo's license and registration.
Although this action lengthened Mr. Perez-Jungo's detention, the Idaho Supreme Court
has held that, even when an officer is acting in a community caretaking capacity and
has determined that the driver does not need assistance, he may request and run a
status check on the person's driver's license. Goodwin, supra, 121 Idaho at 494-95.
Therefore, this action was not outside the boundaries of the community caretaking
exception. However, after running Mr. Perez-Jungo's license and registration through
dispatch and determining that there were no issues, Trooper Marquez did not return the
license and registration and allow Mr. Perez-Jungo to leave, as was required at the
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conclusion of his community caretaking duties. Rather, Trooper Marquez continued to
detain Mr. Perez-Jungo for at least 10 minutes while he waited for back-up units, and
then proceeded to order Mr. Perez-Jungo out of his car.

(Tr., p.25, Ls.5-12, 21-23.)

Once the license and registration came back clear, Trooper Marquez had no further
cause to detain Mr. Perez-Jungo and no reason to order him out of his car.

This

constituted an illegal detention that was not justified by the community caretaker
exception.

2.

Trooper Marquez Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To Continue To
Detain Mr. Perez-Jungo

An investigative detention is constitutionally permissible based upon reasonable
suspicion, derived from specific articulable facts, that the person stopped has committed
or is about to commit a crime. Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 21; State v. Salato, 137 Idaho
260, 264 (Ct. App. 2001). Although the required information leading to formation of
reasonable suspicion in the mind of the police officer is less than the information
required to form probable cause, it still "must be more than mere speculation or a hunch
on the part of the police officer." State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736,738 (Ct. App. 2005).
The reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of the
circumstances at the time of the stop, and the "whole picture must yield a particularized
and objective basis for suspecting that the individual being stopped is or has been
engaged in wrongdoing. State v. Sevy, 129 Idaho 613,615 (Ct. App. 1997).
Here, Trooper Marquez testified to four possible suspicions of criminal activity:
(1) The truck Mr. Perez-Jungo was driving was stolen; (2) Mr. Perez-Jungo was
somehow involved in the vandalisms or thefts involving radio towers that had occurred
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in the area four to six weeks prior; (3) Mr. Perez-Jungo was driving under the influence;
and (3) Mr. Perez-Jungo was trafficking narcotics.

None of these suspicions were

supported by specific, articulable facts.

a.

Trooper Marquez Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion That
Mr. Perez-Jungo's Truck Was Stolen

Trooper Marquez testified that he was initially concerned that Mr. Perez-Jungo's
truck was stolen. (Tr., p.40, Ls.24-2S.) Trooper Marquez did not provide a single fact
supporting this hunch.

However, upon running Mr. Perez-Jungo's license and

registration through dispatch and determining that the truck was, in fact, not stolen, his
unsubstantiated concern was immediately dispelled.

(Tr., 41, Ls.18-22.) Therefore,

Trooper Marquez had no reason to continue the detention to investigate whether the
truck was stolen.

b.

Trooper Marquez Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion That
Mr. Perez-Jungo Was Involved In Vandalisms Or Thefts Of Radio
Towers

Trooper Marquez did not articulate a single reason why he suspected that
Mr. Perez-Jungo was involved in the vandalism or thefts of radio towers.

Trooper

Marquez testified that he received an email in the last four or six weeks stating that
there

had

been

prior vandalisms

of radio

towers

in

the

area.

(Tr., p.9,

Ls.8-11.) However, there is no evidence in the record to indicate that the rural, gravel
road where Mr. Perez-Jungo was parked is, or ever was, a "high crime" area. Further,
even if the location were a high crime area, mere presence in a high crime area is not
enough to support a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.

Illinois v. Wardlaw, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); see also State v. McAfee, 116 Idaho
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1007, 1010 (1989) (holding that a driver who hesitates at a stop sign for a longer period
than usual, in the middle of the night, in an area where recent burglaries had taken
place, does not rise to the articulable level of suspicion necessary for a seizure). As the
Idaho Supreme Court stated in McAfee, "citizens do not become prospective detainees
merely because they are driving late at night and decide to lawfully park on a city
street." Id. at 1009.
The fact that a crime may have occurred in the area more than a month prior is
not grounds for detaining a person who happens to be parked in that area. Such a rule
would allow officers to stop every single person on the road for months after a crime
occurs. Here, there was no evidence tying Mr. Perez-Jungo to the vandalisms or thefts
of the radio towers.

There was no indication that a suspect or vehicle description

existed or that it matched Mr. Perez-Jungo or his truck. There were no statements, tips,
photos, or any other evidence implicating Mr. Perez-Jungo.

Therefore, Trooper

Marquez's hunch was entirely unsubstantiated and he did not have reasonable
suspicion to investigate Mr. Perez-Jungo for theft or vandalism.

c.

Trooper Marquez Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion That
Mr. Perez-Jungo Was Driving Under The Influence

Reasonable suspicion should be evaluated by considering the totality of the
information known to the officer at the time. United States v. Corlez, 449 U.S. 411,417
(1981). Trooper Marquez testified that he suspected that Mr. Perez-Jungo might be
driving under the influence because his eyes were glassy and bloodshot.

(Tr., p.22,

Ls.19-21.) Although bloodshot and glassy eyes may be considered in the totality of the
circumstances in evaluating whether reasonable suspicion exists, no reported case has
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ever held that bloodshot and glassy eyes, alone, constitutes reasonable suspicion. In
Idaho, every case involving bloodshot and glassy eyes as reasonable suspicion
identifies some other evidence of alcohol or drug use. See, e.g., State v. Grigg, 149
Idaho 361, 364 (Ct. App. 2010) (detention was reasonable when defendant had
bloodshot and glassy eyes, reddening of the conjunctiva of his eyes, and eyelid
tremors); State v. Finnicum, 147 Idaho 137, 140 (Ct. App. 2009) (probable cause
existed to arrest defendant who smelled strongly of alcohol, slurred her speech, had
glassy and bloodshot eyes, and seemed confused); State v. Johnson, 137 Idaho 656,
658-60 (Ct. App. 2002) (further detention of defendant was reasonable when defendant
exhibited extreme nervousness, smelled like alcohol, admitted to drinking alcohol, and
had dilated and bloodshot eyes); State v. Pick, 124 Idaho 601, 605 (Ct. App. 1993)
(reasonable suspicion existed to detain defendant when defendant had bloodshot eyes,
admitted to consuming alcohol, and slurred her speech). Other jurisdictions have found
that bloodshot eyes alone are not enough to establish reasonable suspicion that a crime
is being committed. See, e.g., Ferris v. State, 735 A.2d 491 (Md. 1999); State v. Thirty

Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Dollars and No/100 in U.S. Currency, 136 S.W.3d 392
(Tex. Ct. App. 2004).
Further, no additional factors existed that would support reasonable suspicion
that Mr. Perez-Jungo was under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

In addition to

observing Mr. Jungo-Perez's eyes, Trooper Marquez stated that he was aware of the
time of night, the remote location, the "odd hours to be talking to someone about
employment," and the presence of the Santa Muerte figurine. (Tr., p.23, LS.13-25, p.22,
Ls.16-21.) These observations do not amount to reasonable suspicion to believe that

13

Mr. Perez-Jungo was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. As discussed above, the
location where Mr. Perez-Jungo was parked was not a high crime area and simply
driving or parking late at night is not, by itself, suspicious. Similarly, Mr. Perez-Jungo's
explanation for why he was there, that he was meeting a friend to discuss a job, was not
contradicted. Although Trooper Marquez was not required to believe Mr. Perez-Jungo's
explanation, the explanation itself was forthright and reasonable. See, contra, State v.
Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 916 (2001) (co-travelers' conflicting stories about their

destination and the purpose of their trip supported reasonable suspicion). Finally, the
presence of a Santa Muerte figurine, discussed in section C-2-d, has no relation to
driving under the influence and should not be considered as reasonable suspicion to
investigate a person for DU I.
Mr. Perez-Jungo asserts that none of the factors identified by Trooper Marquez,
even taken together, support reasonable suspicion that a person is driving under the
influence except for bloodshot and glassy eyes. Mr. Perez-Jungo further asserts that
bloodshot and glassy eyes, alone, are not enough to establish reasonable suspicion
that an individual is under the influence of alcohol or drugs. There are numerous other
causes for bloodshot and glassy eyes. Here, Mr. Perez-Jungo was driving late at night
and tiredness often causes bloodshot and glassy eyes. If this factor, alone, is sufficient
to create reasonable suspicion, any tired driver or person suffering from allergies will be
subject to detention for an investigation into the possibility they are under the influence
of drugs or alcohol.
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i.

Even If Bloodshot And Glassy Eyes Are Sufficient
Reasonable Suspicion That A Person Is Under The
Influence, Trooper Marquez Illegally Prolonged The
Detention Because He Did Not Investigate Mr. Perez-Jungo
For Driving Under The Influence

Even if this Court were to determine that bloodshot and glassy eyes are
sufficient, alone, to justify a detention and investigation for driving under the influence,
Trooper Marquez went beyond the scope of the investigation and illegally prolonged his
detention of Mr. Perez-Jungo. Where a person is detained, the scope of detention must
be carefully tailored to its underlying justification. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500
(1983). An investigative detention "must be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Jd; see also Goodwin, supra, 121
Idaho at 501. Further, the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive
means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of
time. Jd.

In a DUI investigation, field sobriety tests are the least intrusive means of

investigation. State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474,482 (Ct. App. 1999).
Here, Trooper Marquez never actually investigated Mr. Perez-Jungo for driving
under the influence. Rather, Trooper Marquez continued to detain Mr. Perez-Jungo for
at least ten minutes while he requested back-up units and a drug dog. (Tr., p.24, LS.915, p.25, Ls.1-12.) When back-up units arrived, rather than conducting field sobriety
tests or otherwise evaluating Mr. Perez-Jungo for driving under the influence, the
officers shined their flashlights into Mr. Perez-Jungo's truck. (Tr., p.27, 9-23.) Further,
it is clear that Trooper Marquez never intended to investigate Mr. Perez-Jungo for
driving under the influence. Even after back-up units arrived, Trooper Marquez testified
that he was still waiting for a drug dog even though a drug dug is unnecessary for a DUI
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investigation. (Tr., p.27, Ls.22-23.) Trooper Marquez never told dispatch that he was
investigating a DUI. (Exhibit 12.) He never told his sergeant that he was investigating a
DUI. (Tr., p.47, Ls.2-14.) He never told the back-up officers that arrived at the scene
that they were investigating a DUI. (Tr., p.47, Ls.6-14.) In fact, when back-up units
arrived, Trooper Marquez told them that the reason for the stop was because,
"something isn't right." (Tr., p.47, Ls.15-19.) It is clear that Trooper Marquez made no
effort to dispel or confirm his suspicion that Mr. Perez-Jungo was driving under the
influence and, as such, the detention was illegally prolonged.

d.

Trooper Marquez Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion That
Mr. Perez-Jungo Possessed Or Was Trafficking Drugs

Trooper Marquez testified that he suspected that Mr. Perez-Jungo might be
trafficking drugs. The reasons that Trooper Marquez gave to support this hunch were
the same as those he gave to support his hunch that Mr. Perez-Jungo was driving
under the influence, namely the time of night, the remote location, the "odd hours to be
talking to someone about employment," and the presence of the Santa Muerte figurine.
(Tr., p.23, Ls.13-25, p.22, Ls.16-21.) As discussed above, the first three factors do not
create reasonable suspicion of any crime, and certainly not drug trafficking. The only
other factor Trooper Marquez identified was the presence of a Santa Muerte figurine on
the dashboard, which he testified was associated with drug traffickers. (Tr., p.21, LS.14.)

Courts have only begun to determine what significance, if any, to give to the
presence of figurines of certain saints in drug trafficking cases. Most courts that have
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addressed these saints, commonly Jesus Malverde3 and Santa Muerte, have done so in
the context of expert testimony. See, e.g. United States v. Pena Ponce, 588 F.3d 579
(8th Cir. 2009). However, several courts have refused to consider the presence of such
saints at all, citing constitutional concerns.

See e.g. State

V.

Oe La Rosa, 208 P.3d

"1012, 1018 n.2 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (refusing to consider the observation of a Jesus
Malverde medallion in its reasonable suspicion calculus, despite the officer's "detailed
testimony" about the training and experience he received regarding its symbolism,
because Jesus Malverde is also celebrated by poor people in Latin America and
"permitting officials to conduct otherwise unlawful searches based on a medallion that
supposedly has significance only to Hispanics raises the same kind of serious
constitutional concerns as other forms of profiling").
Although some courts have found that the presence of a Santa Meurte or Jesus
Malverde statue or image can be a factor in a reasonable suspicion determination, the
officers in every one of those cases had significant particularized suspicion beyond the
presence of the saints. See, e.g., Pena-Ponce, supra, 588 F.3d. at 584 (officers had
reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking when suspect stalled while answering
questions, the passenger in the car showed excessive nervousness, the suspect and
the passenger had conflicting stories about where they had been, there were multiple
cell phones in the truck and the passenger tried to kick one of the phones out of view,

Jesus Malverde is a Mexican folk hero who earned a Robin Hood-type image, making
him popular among the poor. Because of his outlaw image, he has been adopted by
certain criminal organizations as their "patron saint." However, his intercession is also
sought by those with troubles of various kinds, and a number of supposed miracles
have been locally attributed to him, including personal healings and blessings. See
Wikipedia, Jesus Malverde, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jesus_Malverde (describing
history of Jesus Malverde) (as of Jane. 28, 2014, 05:37 GMT).
3
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and there was a Santa Muerte figurine on the dashboard); United States v. LopezGutierrez, 334 Fed. Appx. 880 (10th Cir. 2009) (officers had reasonable suspicion when

they saw scarring on the seat belt bolts and a reattached airbag indicating alterations
designed to hide contraband, air fresheners and a rose to mask the smell of drugs,
three cells phones, one small suitcase that contradicted the suspects' story that they
had spent more than a week in Las Vegas, and two pictures of Jesus Malverde on the
dashboard and around the suspect's neck); State

V.

Alvarez, 147 P.3d 425, 433 (Utah

2006) (officers had reasonable suspicion when they observed the suspect make two
short visits on consecutive days to condominiums known for drug dealing, two tips had
been received about drug dealing in the condominiums, one of which was specific to the
suspect's vehicle, and a Jesus Malverde medallion was present).
Unlike clothing displaying marijuana leaves or other direct drug references, Santa
Muerte is a valid religious symbol for millions of people. While it is true that innocuous
items may indicate drug possession or trafficking, such items individually do not, without
more, create reasonable suspicion. For example, a straw would not, without additional
factors, amount to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. A straw is a common piece
of drug paraphernalia, but it also has obvious ordinary uses. Similarly, a Santa Muerte
figurine may indicate drug trafficking, but it may also indicate a popular religious symbol
or simply an affinity for skeletons in robes. Here, Trooper Marquez did not have any
evidence of drug trafficking beyond the presence of the Santa Muerte figurine and his
hunch that "something isn't right."

At the time that he detained Mr. Perez-Jungo,

Trooper Marquez did not smell marijuana, see any residue or indication of drugs, or see
anything that could be identified as drug paraphernalia.
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He merely saw a person

parked at night in a rural area with a Santa Muerte figurine on the dashboard. This is
exactly the "mere speculation or hunch" that the Fourth Amendment prohibits.
In sum, Trooper Marquez's hunches ranged from driving under the influence to
trafficking narcotics to vandalizing radio towers. Not a single one of these hunches was
supported by reasonable suspicion, and multiple unsubstantiated hunches do not create
particularized suspicion of criminal activity.

Contrary to the district court's ultimate

finding, the State failed to provide evidence of reasonable articulable suspicion for
Trooper Marquez to continue to detain Mr. Perez-Jungo and, therefore, all evidence
obtained as a result of the prolonged detention must be suppressed.

3.

All Evidence Collected Following The Illegal Detention
Suppressed As It Is Fruit Of The Illegal Governmental Activity

Must Be

The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence is appropriate only
to evidence that is fruit of the illegal governmental activity. Segura, supra, 468 U.S. at
815; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho
245, 249 (1990). The test is "whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality,
the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that
illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint." Wong Sun, supra, 371 U.S. at 488. Suppression is required if "the evidence
sought to be suppressed would not have come to light but for the government's
unconstitutional conduct." State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 184 (Ct. App. 2005).
Trooper Marquez illegally prolonged his detention of Mr. Perez-Jungo after he
had performed his caretaking function. Had Mr. Perez-Jungo not been illegally seized,
the evidence located in the vehicle would not have been discovered. The State failed to
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meet its burden of showing that the evidence is untainted; therefore, all the evidence
collected after the impermissible seizure must be suppressed as fruit of the illegal police
activity.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Perez-Jungo respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment and
commitment, reverse the order denying his Motion to Suppress, and remand the case to
the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 4th day of February, 2014.

KIMBERLY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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